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Abstract
The constraint solver is a symbolic cryptographic protocol security analysis tool that is based on a unique
term rewriting approach. Several of the design characteristics of this tool, and the reasons for them, are
discussed and placed in perspective with other approaches. The constraint solver uses a free message
algebra and a bounded-process network model with a Dolev-Yao attacker. These choices yield simplicity
and decidability.
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1 Introduction
Symbolic analysis of security protocols originated with the Dolev-Yao paper [21],
which was ﬁrst published in 1981 as a Stanford report. Their idea was to represent
cryptography abstractly in an algebraic context. A public-key cryptosystem had
a pair of operators, Ea and Da, for encryption and decryption, for each user a
that might participate in the protocol. The term Ea(M) represented the result of
encrypting M with a’s public key, and Da(M) was the decryption of M using a’s
corresponding private key. There were two term rewriting rules, which applied to
a composition of operators: DaEa reduces to the identity operator, and so does
EaDa. It was assumed that anyone could use the encryption operator for any user,
but only a could apply the decryption operator Da. Besides the encryption and
decryption operators, there was also a “name stamp” operator and its inverse that
appends or removes a user name after a message.
By itself, this is only a model of a message algebra. There was also a model
of protocols and a network environment. The only protocols that were considered
were a simple kind that were called “Ping-Pong” protocols in a subsequent paper
[20]. These are two-party protocols in which the ﬁrst message has the form α1(M),
where M is a secret, and α1 is a composition of operators. Subsequent responses
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and replies could only apply more operators to the received term and send it out
again, so that all available messages have the same form α(M).
There have been many extensions and modiﬁcations over the years to the mes-
sage algebra and protocol speciﬁcation style, but the Dolev-Yao characterization of
the network environment with its “saboteur” has remained essentially the same in
symbolic protocol analysis. The saboteur is both a user z and an active eavesdrop-
per who can modify any message in transit. Messages are modiﬁed by applying a
string of operators to any known message, and the result may be delivered to any
user. The saboteur is limited to Dz for decryption. The protocol is insecure if the
saboteur can expose the original secret M , by reducing the operator sequence α on
some message to the identity.
This characterization has a subtlety that is sometimes neglected in attempts
to develop new analysis techniques. Note that messages modiﬁed by the saboteur
can be fed back to an honest user to obtain the transformational eﬀect of whatever
operators that user applies at any stage of the protocol. And if the user has reached
stage n in its role, the saboteur can still get a transformation from stage m < n by
starting up a new concurrent session of that (or another) user. A successful attack
might require many sessions of the same user to be started up. We don’t have to
know how they can be forced by the saboteur, just that they are possible.
Terminology has changed over the years. Many synonyms for “saboteur” have
been used, such as penetrator, attacker, intruder, and spy. A user is referred to as
a principal or agent, and the concept of principal has been extended to include any
user agent that controls some secret key.
2 Motivation
Before going into more detail on the constraint solver and the role of term rewriting,
it might be best to say a little about why protocol analysis was seen as desirable,
and what other approaches are being used.
The need for some kind of careful analysis of cryptographic protocols was ﬁrst
made known publicly by the Denning-Sacco paper [17], which demonstrated a replay
attack on the symmetric-key Needham-Schroeder protocol [40]. A replay attack
is one in which the attacker records the message exchanges from a normal run
of a protocol, and then actively inserts those messages, or parts of them, into a
subsequent run, to compromise the protocol. In the Denning-Sacco example, it
was assumed that a session key used in the earlier normal run had eventually been
revealed somehow. Then the replay attack caused that same key to be accepted in
the later run instead of a new key.
The concept of a replay attack was already known in some circles, at the time,
along with other types having colorful names such as “masquerading” and “man-in-
the-middle”. An algebraic approach supersedes these rubrics, just as ﬁrst-order logic
supersedes syllogisms, although they can still help to support informal, intuitive
analysis.
My own view of the broader picture of cryptographic protocol analysis is shown
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in Figure 1. This picture categorizes analysis approaches according to the tools
and techniques used to perform the analysis. At the top level, symbolic methods,
sometimes called formal methods, are distinguished from methods employing com-
putational models. Symbolic methods had their origin in the Dolev-Yao model;
computational models arise from methods used in the analysis of cryptographic
algorithms.
The main diﬀerence between the two is that computational models can recognize
leakage of information from an encrypted message that is less than the entire mes-
sage, while in symbolic approaches a message is either entirely compromised or safe.
An example of the kind of problem that is not detectable symbolically, but which
should be found computationally, is Bleichenbacher’s “million-message” attack on a
public key standard protocol [8]. The ciphertext is revealed by combining fractional
bits of information from many runs. Computational approaches treat key guessing
as a probabilistic exponential time activity, as opposed to the symbolic approach of
just considering key guessing as impossible. One formulation of the computational
approach is given in [28].
In the last few years, considerable eﬀort has been put into reconciling symbolic
and computational approaches, beginning with the Abadi and Rogaway paper [1].
The idea is to prove that symbolic conclusions are valid if the real cryptographic
operations satisfy suﬃciently strong properties. A ﬁne-grained categorization of
relevant security deﬁnitions is given in [5], including such properties as indistin-
guishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks. A library of operations proved to
have strong enough properties has been proposed [3]. As pointed out by Blanchet
[7], however, using strongly secure libraries is not as easy as one might hope, be-
cause the operations in them do not exactly match the ones axiomatized in most
symbolic models, and additional assumptions and restrictions might apply to the
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protocols and the environment in which they are used.
Symbolic protocol analysis has been conducted using several diﬀerent tools and
techniques, as shown in Figure 1. One elegant but limited approach originated
with BAN logic, a specialized modal logic that required a protocol to be idealized
into logical statements [10]. The idealization step had underlying assumptions that
could not be adequately systematized, so despite several papers proposing diﬀerent
versions of it, it is now used primarily as an aid to intuition.
The goal of proving protocols correct was carried on in the second thread, using
various types of state-transition speciﬁcations of protocols as the object of inductive
proofs that data was shared properly among authorized participants. Such proofs
must take into account attacker actions and multiple sessions. Both hand proofs and
software tool-supported proofs were demonstrated; see, for example, [9,41,44,46,13].
It turns out that a rigorous security proof for a protocol is a long, arduous, error-
prone procedure, with a similar ﬂavor to a program proof. The ﬁrst tool-supported
proof that was well enough explained to encourage imitation using other provers
was by Paulson [41].
A few researchers hit upon the idea of using a model checker to explore the
state space of a cryptographic protocol. Roscoe might have been the ﬁrst [42].
Using a model checker generally means making some approximation or imposing
some theoretically severe limitation on the protocol and environment model. But
this disadvantage is counterbalanced by the ease of specifying the protocol and
the ability to explore modiﬁcations in the protocol and environmental assumptions
quickly and easily. And over the years, model checkers and analysis techniques have
improved. Model checking runs took an hour or so at ﬁrst, which was still better
than the days needed to update an inductive proof after a modiﬁcation, but now a
few seconds will usually do.
Model checking in the general sense was being done from quite early on, in
the sense that there were specialized tools for exploring the protocol state space
[37]. The real boost for protocol analysis came from the use of general-purpose
model checkers built for other applications. Some early examples of this approach
are [29,39,16]. This way, many groups of researchers could use well-supported, or
at least locally supported, tools that they already had, rather than having to im-
port experimental software with which they were unfamiliar. Also, the limitations
imposed by practical model checking were clear and easily understood, while spe-
cially designed analyzers were too complex to understand exactly what attacks they
might miss. In fact, the use of general-purpose model checkers had the side eﬀect
of raising the standards for symbolic state-exploration protocol analysis, so that
newer specialized tools and newer versions of older tools are much improved in their
conceptual clarity.
The specialized tools listed in Figure 1 are just a small sample that includes a few
old and new tools. They are: the Interrogator [37], the Naval Research Laboratory
Protocol Analyzer [34], Athena [45], the “On-the-ﬂy Model Checker” [4], Proverif
[6], and the Cryptographic Protocol Shape Analyzer [19].
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3 Protocol Analysis With The Constraint Solver
One of the protocol analysis methods that uses a kind of rewriting approach is the
constraint solver, which I developed with Vitaly Shmatikov’s help [38], making use
of observations and suggestions from others at the SRI Computer Science Lab, par-
ticularly Harald Ruess and Bruno Dutertre. The constraint solver adopts the strand
space model [46] as a way to specify protocols, but does not use the authentication
test analysis approach [18]
The constraint solver has two phases. The ﬁrst phase uses the protocol spec-
iﬁcation to generate a large number of systems of derivation constraints. Each
constraint system corresponds to a potential message event sequence.
Then, in the second phase, it tries to solve the constraint systems. A solved
system yields a realizable event sequence that can be interpreted as an attack on
the protocol. A constraint system is solved, or found to be unsolvable, using a
rewriting procedure.
A trivial example will help to explain how it works. Consider the following
(laughably insecure) protocol:
A → B : [A,Mpk(B)]
B → A : Mpk(A)
The notation Xpk(Y ) represents the encryption of X with the public key of Y , and
[X,Y ] is the concatenation of X and Y .
3.1 Generation Phase
As in many protocol analysis approaches, the “Alice and Bob” notation must be
turned into a process view where the roles of the initiator and responder are sepa-
rated. We get the two roles:
Initiator (A,B,M) Responder (B,A,M)
send [A,Mpk(B)] receive [A,Mpk(B)]
receive Mpk(A) send Mpk(A)
Note that identiﬁers A,B,M occurring as parameters of a role may be instantiated
diﬀerently in another role or in another instance of the same role.
At this point we must face the main limitation of the constraint solver, and
that is its bounded-process limitation. Recall that, in the Dolev-Yao environment
model, any number of instances of each role may be started up. The bounded-
process limitation requires us to state in advance how many instances of each role
we will consider during the analysis. Imposing this bound makes the secrecy problem
decidable. This was observed by Huima [27] and proved with an NP-completeness
result by Rusinowitch and Turuani [43].
Although the bounded-process limitation may cause us to miss some attack on
the protocol, it has the useful advantage that the security problem (more specif-
ically, the message secrecy problem) is decidable under this assumption, whereas
it is undecidable otherwise (if no other limitation is imposed). Undecidability of
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the security of cryptographic protocols has been established many times; see, for
example, [26,22]. The security of ping-pong protocols is decidable in polynomial
time, but adding a second encrypted ﬁeld, for example, pushes the problem over
the edge into undecidability [23].
Suppose, for now, that we allow only one instance of each role, and omit the
receive event for A, which does not aﬀect the secrecy goal. We generate all possible
message event sequences consistent with the order of messages in each role. In this
example there are only three possibilities:
A sends [A,Mpk(B)] B
′ recvs [A′,Mpk(B′)] B
′ recvs [A′,Mpk(B′)]
B′ recvs [A′,Mpk(B′)] A sends [A,Mpk(B)] B
′ sends M ′pk(A′)
B′ sends M ′pk(A′) B
′ sends M ′pk(A′) A sends [A,Mpk(B)]
Note that parameters have been renamed in the responder role since the re-
sponder may disagree with the initiator on the identity of the initiator or other
parameters. The scope of a parameter variable is now the whole event sequence.
The diﬀerence between a potential event sequence and a realizable event sequence
is that each received message must be derivable by the attacker from available
data. The attacker can use messages that were previously sent, subterms of them
obtained by decomposing them, and whatever data the attacker is assumed to know
in advance, such as public keys, the attacker’s own private key, protocol-related
constants, and names of principals.
If there are more role instances and they are longer, the number of possible event
sequences can get large. For two role instances of lengths m and n, the number of
potential mergings is the number of binomial combinations C(m + n, n). However,
there are some optimizations that can reduce the number that need to be considered.
What matters is which messages have been sent when a received message must
be derived. Consequently, if two consecutive send events occur, their order does not
matter. Also, a send event can occur as soon as the prior receive event in the same
role, and delaying it results only in a sequence that is less likely to be realizable.
Putting these two observations together, the number of potential sequences that
need to be considered is found by measuring the length of a role by the number of
received messages only. In the example, we can get by with just one sequence (the
ﬁrst).
In other examples, the number of potential event sequences is still so large that
further optimizations are desirable. Corin and Etalle [15] took advantage of the
fact that many sequences share a common preﬁx. If a partial constraint system
is generated for a preﬁx, and found to be unsolvable, then one can eliminate all
the sequences with that preﬁx. This seems to have a substantial beneﬁt. Another
optimization by Basin, et al. [4] called constraint diﬀerentiation yields a further
improvement.
Each event sequence results in a system of derivation constraints, one for each
receive event. A derivation constraint states that a received message term is deriv-
able from a set of available terms. The single receive event in the example sequence
J. Millen / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 234 (2009) 77–9182
generates the constraint
[A,Mpk(B)]  [A
′,M ′pk(B′)].
The meaning of “derivability” will be discussed momentarily, but it should be obvi-
ous that this constraint is solved by the unifying substitution A = A′, B = B′, and
M = M ′. In general, “solvability” means that there exists a global substitution on
the parameters of all role instances such that the derivability constraints are proved
to be satisﬁed by applying the available rules. Thus, solvability of the constraint
system is required for realizability of the event sequence.
The solution above does not mean that the protocol is insecure, merely that
there exists a realizable instance of a normal run of the protocol. To test for a
compromise of the message M , we can add a “listener” role to the protocol with
the single event recv(M). Appending this event to the end of the event sequence
(the best and suﬃcient place to put it), we get a second constraint:
[A,Mpk(B)],M
′
pk(A′)  M.
We do not want the solution that sets M = A, because M is a secret and A is
not. We can enforce this exclusion by introducing symbolic constants a and m such
that A = a and M = m. This works because the constraint solver’s message term
algebra is free. In a free algebra, constants with diﬀerent names are not equal, so
this prevents the uninteresting solution A = M .
The other incorrect solution that we must guard against arises from the Dolev-
Yao assumption that the attacker is a principal. If the attacker’s name is e, and we
use the substitution B = e, the second constraint becomes
[a,mpk(e)],mpk(a)  m.
A rule to derive m from mpk(e) is always assumed, since e is the attacker. So this
constraint is solved. But the solution is trivial, because it says only that the initiator
has deliberately chosen to share m with e. This is not a compromise.
We can avoid this spurious solution by introducing another constant b to instan-
tiate B, making B distinct from A and from the attacker e. In eﬀect, we have had
to pin down the secret m and the two principals who are expected to share it, a
and b. And we did this by instantiating parameters of only that role instance that
created the secret m. (We might also want to consider a scenario with A = B = a,
since that is not excluded by the protocol speciﬁcation.)
With the starting substitution A = a, B = b, M = m, are the two constraints
solvable? We leave it to the reader to check that they are, by setting A′ = e,
B′ = b, M ′ = m. There is no reason to exclude this solution. It reﬂects a mas-
querading attack by e against b, which works because the message received by b is
not authenticated.
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3.2 Derivation Constraints and Solvability
The constraint solver does not actually use derivation rules. Instead, it has deriva-
tion constraint transformations, and an algorithm for how to apply them and when
to stop. However, the attacker’s capabilities are deﬁned by derivation rules, and
those rules are used to justify the transformations.
Here are two typical constraint transformation rules, in which T is an arbitrary
list of terms, treated as an unordered set, and e is the constant attacker identity:
T  upk(v) T, upk(e)  v
T  u; T  v T, u  v
In each rule, if the system has a constraint matching the pattern above the line,
that constraint is replaced by the constraint or constraints below the line.
The ﬁrst rule is based on the attacker’s ability to construct upk(v) from u and
v. The transformation reduces the original constraint to two simpler constraints.
The second rule is based on the attacker’s ability to extract u from upk(e). In both
cases, the logical implication is upward – ability to solve the new constraint(s) is
suﬃcient to solve the original constraint.
The constraint transformations we have chosen are easily seen to be sound, in
the sense that they do not introduce new solutions. Any solution to a transformed
system is a solution to the original system.
The uniﬁcation transformation is based on the trivial rule T, u  u. It just
tests for a match between the term to be derived and one that is already known.
Because terms contain variables, this involves uniﬁcation (which is simple syntactic
uniﬁcation in a free algebra). The uniﬁcation transformation eliminates a constraint
T, u  v when u is uniﬁable with v. Then the most general uniﬁer is applied to the
whole system, and retained as part of the ultimate solution.
We also need to show completeness: namely, that any solution to the original
system is preserved by some sequence of transformations. Note that several trans-
formations may be applicable to a given constraint system, and diﬀerent choices
lead to branching in the tree of transformation sequences.
The branching means that the solver performs a tree search to ﬁnd a solution.
It stops at the ﬁrst solution. If it does not ﬁnd one after searching the whole tree,
it reports failure (which is often a good thing, when a solution demonstrates a
compromise).
Finally, we have to show termination: every sequence of transformations ends
in a constraint system to which no further transformations apply. Also, it must
be clear whether a terminal constraint system has a solution or not. Termination
is proved in [38] using a measure of the complexity of the constraint system, and
showing that each transformation reduces it. In order to achieve this result, we had
to restrict the order in which transformations could be applied. In particular, the
sequence of constraints is signiﬁcant, and the next transformation must be applied
to the ﬁrst constraint that is transformable. This restriction aﬀects the completeness
proof, of course.
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A constraint of the form T  x, where x is a variable (i.e., an uninstantiated
parameter) is solvable in inﬁnitely many ways, since an inﬁnite number of terms can
be derived from any nonempty T . Constraints like this are called simple and are not
transformed, even by uniﬁcation. A constraint system that is either empty or has
only simple constraints is solved, since there is at least one successful substitution
for all the remaining variables.
4 Design and Testing Choices
As simple as the constraint solver is, there are several design choices in it that have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect, and such choices are made by other protocol analysis tools as
well. The bounded-process limitation has already been mentioned. There are others
that the reader has probably noticed that merit some discussion.
4.1 Small-System Testing
For some protocols, the bounded-process limitation is not an issue. Lowe has iden-
tiﬁed a class of protocols for which it is suﬃcient to analyze a “small system”
consisting of one instance of each role [30]. Six assumptions about properties of
the protocol are needed to yield this result. The most limiting of these is the ﬁfth:
encrypted components are textually distinct. This means that distinct encrypted
terms in an Alice-and-Bob speciﬁcation are not uniﬁable. Thus, a principal that
receives an encrypted term knows unambiguously which message and which ﬁeld it
came from. (The assumption excludes trivial uniﬁcations in which a message term
is simply passed on in a later message.)
The example protocol used earlier does not satisfy this condition, since the
responder’s reply is uniﬁable with the second component of the ﬁrst message. So
we were just lucky to ﬁnd an attack using only a small-system instance.
An example of a protocol that requires two instances of the same role is
Example 1.3 in [21], rewritten in our notation:
A → B : [Mpk(B), A]pk(B)
B → A : [Mpk(A), B]pk(A)
To compromise M , the attacker records the ﬁrst message from A, and substi-
tutes it for M in a new session between the attacker e and B. Then B returns
[[Mpk(B), A]pk(e), B]pk(e) to e. The part of the reply encrypted by pk(B) is then fed
back by e to a new instance of B, who re-encrypts it for e.
For this attack, the two instances of B are consecutive. Some attacks require
the two instances to overlap concurrently. This kind of attack is called a parallel
attack, and an example of one was given in [48]. One can construct a protocol that
can be compromised only with a parallel attack; an example called “ﬀgg” was given
in [35]. It can be expressed as follows, where N and N ′ are nonces generated by B,
and M is a secret created by A. It takes two concurrent instances of the responder
(B) role to compromise M .
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A → B : A
B → A : [B,N,N ′]
A → B : [A, [N,N ′,M ]pk(B)]
B → A : [N,N ′, [N ′,M,N ]pk(B)]
There is a related but diﬀerent question about how many diﬀerent principals
might be needed to implement an attack. While the number of role instances
cannot be bounded in general, many role instances can share a bounded set of
principals. Comon-Lundh and Cortier [14] show that it is usually suﬃcient to name
only two principals (they use the term “agent”), one of which is the attacker. (The
exception is when a protocol contains explicit tests to force principal parameters to
be distinct.)
4.2 Data Types and Keys
The constraint solver does not distinguish diﬀerent subsorts of the message sort.
Although we talk about principals and public keys, each operation accepts any
message for any of its arguments. There are two encryption operators, one for
public-key encryption and the other for symmetric-key encryption.
One advantage of the constraint solver, with respect to comparable tools, is
that any message can be used as a symmetric key. This permits us to model a
common real-life practice of constructing keys by hashing arbitrary messages into a
suitable key size. (One of Shmatikov’s major contributions was to make sure that
the constraint solver’s analysis procedure was complete and terminating despite this
degree of ﬂexibility.)
Key construction is not necessarily a type violation, since an explicit hash or
other type coercion operation can produce a key type from something else. Some
protocol analysis approaches permit such operations, others do not.
The constraint solver can discover type ﬂaw attacks, in which the attacker ex-
tracts a message ﬁeld of one type – a nonce or key, for example – and re-introduces
it into a message ﬁeld that is supposed to be a diﬀerent type, such as a principal
name or an encrypted submessage. One could view the Dolev-Yao example attack
above as a kind of type ﬂaw, if the message M is expected to be a character string.
Other protocol analysis approaches impose type restrictions on operators. De-
pendable typing is risky to assume, however, because messages are subject to mod-
iﬁcation by attackers, who might defeat the type-tagging mechanisms by extracting
data and re-tagging it. A type tag is like a concatenation [type1,X] that an attacker
can modify to [type2,X]. Cryptographic techniques can be used to protect typing,
however, as shown by Heather, Lowe, and Schneider [25]. The basic idea is that an
attacker cannot successfully recast [type1,X]K as type2 without knowing K.
4.3 Concatenation
The concatenation operator [X,Y ] is often modeled as a non-associative binary
operator, but it may also be treated as associative or n-ary. The choice can make a
diﬀerence. Consider the protocol:
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A → B : [A,Na]pk(B)
B → A : [Na, [Nb, B]]pk(A)
A → B : (Na)pk(B)
This is a slight variation (ﬁeld order in the ﬁrst message) on Lowe’s modiﬁcation of
Needham-Schroeder [29]. If an attacker X initiates a session with B, masquerading
as A and using X in place of Na, X receives a response encrypted for A:
X/A → B : [A,X]pk(B)
B → X/A : [X, [Nb, B]]pk(A)
where X/A is X masquerading as A. But, then X can initiate a session in which A
is the responder:
X → A : [X, [Nb, B]]pk(A)
A → X : [[Nb, B], [Na, A]]pk(X)
After this, X knows B’s nonce Nb, and can ﬁnish the ﬁrst session with B, while
still pretending to be A. This example was discovered using the constraint solver.
This could be viewed as a type ﬂaw, since A is asked to accept [Nb, B] as a
nonce. But the vulnerability also hinges on recognizing [X, [Nb, B]] as a binary
concatenation. If the protocol had been speciﬁed to use a ternary concatenation
[Na, Nb, B] in the second message, the attack fails, because A is expecting a binary
concatenation in the ﬁrst message of the responder role.
4.4 Free Algebra
The constraint solver uses a free message term algebra, following the example of
the strand space formulation [46]. In a free algebra, two ground terms can be equal
only if they are identical. This brings some conveniences but also some limitations.
The completeness and termination proofs for the constraint solver depend on this
property of the message algebra.
One limitation is that if we have an encryption operator, there is no explicit
decryption operator. So, in particular, the original Dolev-Yao algebra is not free. At
ﬁrst sight, this might not appear to be limiting in practice, because, ﬁrst, typical real
protocols do not make explicit use of a decryption operator, and, second, because the
ability of honest principals and the attacker to decrypt messages can be expressed
implicitly. For honest principals, a role might simply receive Mpk(A) and place M
in a return message. An attacker can use a derivation rule like upk(e)  u.
Yet, there is a limitation, because it prevents the attacker from decrypting a
message that has never been encrypted. We can give a simple, albeit artiﬁcial,
example of why this matters. Consider the following protocol, shown in Figure 2.
This is clearly an unrealistic protocol – one could not even express it in the Alice-
and-Bob form – but our protocol model does not exclude it. In the ﬁgure, SK is the
symmetric encryption of S with the key K. Symmetric decryption is not required
to specify the protocol, but it would be written SK .
In this protocol, it is assumed that S is a secret, K is a symmetric key that
is shared by certain trusted principals but not the attacker, C is a symmetric key
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A B
◦
SK 
(XC)K
 ◦

◦
X 
Fig. 2. Compromise Hidden By Free Algebra
known to everyone, and X is just a parameter representing an unknown message.
When the initiator sends SK , an honest responder can interpret this as
((SC)C)K , which is acceptable with X = SC . The responder then transmits X,
and the attacker encrypts it with C to get XC = (SC)C = S. This compromise
cannot be found if the message algebra is free, since the decryption operator is not
available, so X = SC is not a permissible substitution.
This example was given in [36], where it is shown that symmetric decryption
does not introduce extra vulnerabilities if all encryption is received with context.
In other words, if every encrypted term has some structure (i.e., it is not just a
variable), there are no vulnerabilities that are hidden from analysis using a free
algebra. This condition was called EV-freedom. The result in [36] was proved only
for symmetric encryption. It was extended to public-key encryption (with PEV-
freedom) by Lynch and Meadows [32].
5 Concluding Remarks
The constraint solver employs term rewriting in a unique way. There are other
approaches to modeling and analyzing protocols that use term rewriting more di-
rectly. We have already mentioned the Dolev-Yao model of ping-pong protocols,
but more general models were needed to handle realistic protocols. Early tools like
the Interrogator [37] and the NRL protocol analyzer [34] had message algebras with
both symmetric and asymmetric encryption, rules for state transitions of role in-
stances, and rules for updating the set of terms known to the attacker. The NRL
analyzer went further by identifying narrowing as the procedure for determining
when a state transition could generate a given message term that is a knowledge
goal for the attacker. Narrowing is essentially uniﬁcation in an equational theory,
as needed to represent cancellation of encryption and decryption, and the NRL
analyzer implemented an existing narrowing algorithm.
The MSR (multiset rewriting) notation is a formal meta-notation motivated by a
linear logic concept [12]. The multiset is a global bag of facts about the current state
of each role instance and the attacker knowledge. Additions to attacker knowledge
and replacement of role instance states are both easily represented as term rewriting
rules. Linear logic oﬀers a special formalism for uniquely originating nonces, using
an existential quantiﬁer that is assumed to generate new symbols.
For example, the rule:
B0(), N1(x) → ∃y.B1(x, y), N2(x, y)
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is applicable when the multiset contains at least one instance of the “facts” B0()
and N1(x), and replaces them by the pair of facts on the right, after creating a
new nonce symbol y. A fact Bi(...) is an instance of the “B” role in state i with
a given list of parameter data (which is empty in state 0). A fact N1(x) means
that the data term x has been transmitted and is available in the network to be
received. The facts on the right indicate that the pair (x, y) is to be transmitted,
and B transitions to state 1 with values for parameters x and y.
This model was implemented in a tool designed to study linear logic. A special
tool is not really necessary to simulate this model; existing applications of model
checking tools use tricks such as sequence numbering to simulate nonces.
Current frontiers in protocol analysis are in three main directions. One is to
support a wider choice of encryption operators. Much work has been done already
to handle exclusive-or encryption [47] and Diﬃe-Hellman key distribution, based
on modular exponentiation [31,24]. These operators have a commutative character
that is challenging to handle algebraically in an eﬃcient way. Two of the more
recently considered unusual operators are bilinear pairings [33], as used in elliptic
curve cryptography, and zero-knowledge proofs [2].
The second frontier is to create tools that support computational models in some
way. Work in this category includes [11,7]. Finally, the third frontier is to broaden
the scope of security goals that can be analyzed. Some of these topics are voting,
anonymity, contract-signing, trust management, and group protocols with evolving
membership. The ﬁeld has gotten considerably broader and deeper in the last few
years!
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